CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

1-2 MAY 1964

Commission No

131

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT:

Lee Harvey OSWALD's Access to Classified Information About the U-2

I. Reference is made to your letter, dated 13 April 1964, captioned "Lee Harvey OSWALD, Internal Security - Russia - Cuba", and to the attachment which contained statements made by one, Dugane J. HCBES, EMC. USN. Your letter requested certain information regarding subject's Marine assignment at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan, in 1987 and 1988. The remarks furnished below are addressed to the contents of your letter and to the statements in the attachment.

- 2. The Atsagi Naval Air Station is located approximately 35 miles south and west of Tokyo, Japan. At the time in question, Atsagi was a "closed" base in the sense that American and indigenous personnel entering the Station were required to possess official identification cards. Within the Station, the flight line areas were restricted, as is the case of all such Stations, and certain hangar areas were further restricted for the performance of classified functions.
- 3. The Joint Technical Advisory Crosp (JTAC) occupied an area within the Ctation, condicting of 20 to 25 individual residences, two dermitories, an office area, a power plant, several Batter-type werehouses, and a club building used for recreation and a backelor officers, meas. The JTAG area was not closed, but it was located about 600 yards from the main

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Station area and there was no occasion for the regularly assigned Station personnel to visit the JIAC area. The club was open only to JIAC personnel and their gentse. Two of the living quarter were occupied by the Navy commanding officer and his deputy because the quarter set JIAC were of hetter quality than the liquing accommodations provided at the Station.

- 4. JUAG air activities were conducted from a classified hangar area at one end of the flight I'me. OSWALD did not have access to this area. Prior to the time in question, MAG had been publicized by itadio Oching as being a headquarters for American intelligence activity. For this reaton, and becau c JTAG was obviously not a past of the Naval Air Station complement, there were rumore and goodly regarding the unit and its activitie . This condition was regarded as normal under such circumstances. Being there at that time, CSWALD could have heard uch gossin; however, there is no information to indicate, nor is there reason to believe, that he obtained factual knowledge regarding STAG and its mission. (For your information, an incident involving the landing of a U-2 in a rice paddy in Managawa Prefecture, Japan, was reported in the press and aroused come public interest. That incident, however, occurred in December 1959, which was one time after OSWALD had left Japan).
- 5. There were no Navy personnel assigned to JTAG. Moreover JTAG did not participate in, or transfer any of, its activities to a Station in Bangkolt. Regarding the statement by HOBBS that a Navy Commander was recruiting Navy Personnel for an assignment in Bangkok, if is noted that the Navy at that time was conducting certain air reconnal esance activity from Atougi using other types of aircraft.
- 6. The following should be considered with respect to your source's assertions that CSWALD's squadron was in Cubi Foint, Philippine Islands in January 1953 where it kept its goar is in what the source now knows to have been a hangar for a U-2 airpians; and that the squadron was back in Atsugt, Japan in May 1958. The term "U-2" was not known rubbiely and did not gain world-wide retoriety until the ill-fated Towers mission some two years later. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the term "U-2" would have meant anything to CSVALD, even if he had heard it and had been able to identify the term with any mireraft at Cuin Point, at Atsugi or anywhere else.

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- There is no evidence or indication that COVALD and any association with, or access to, the JTAC operation or its program in Japan. This applies also to information regarding the U-2 or its mission. Even if POVALD and seen a U-2 aircraft as Atengi or elsewhere, this fact would not have been considered unusual nor have constituted a treach of security. Umited public exposure of the craft treat but not of its nomentalization or mission was accepted as a necessary risk. It is most unlikely that COVALD had the necessary prerequisites to differentiate between the U-2 and other ningraft engaged in classified missions which were similarly visible at Atsugi at the same time.
- 8. A copy of this mercorandum is being forwarded to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy.

M(Signed) School Bales

Richard Fleims

Deputy Director for Plans

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CC-President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy

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